Two games are best-response equivalent if they have the same best-response correspondence. We provide a characterization of when two games are best-response equivalent. The characterizations exploit a dual relationship between payoff differences and beliefs. Some "potential game" arguments [Games Econ. Behav. 14 (1996) 124] rely only on the property that potential games are best-response equivalent to identical interest games. Our results show that a large class of games are best-response equivalent to identical interest games, but are not potential games. Thus we show how some existing potential game arguments can be extended.
Introduction
We consider three progressively stronger equivalence relations on games and characterize each of them.
• Two games are best-response equivalent if they have the same best-response correspondence.
• Two games are better-response equivalent if, for every pair of strategies, they agree when one strategy is better than the other.
• Two games are von Neumann-Morgenstern equivalent (VNM-equivalent) if, for each player, the payoff function in one game is equal to a constant times the payoff function in the other game, plus a function that depends only on the opponents' strategies.
Two games are VNM-equivalent if and only if, for each player i, there is a constant w i > 0 such that the ratio of payoff differences from switching between one strategy to another strategy is always w i . The constant w i is thus independent of the strategies being compared.
Two games are better-response equivalent if and only if they have the same dominance relations and, for each player i and each pair of strategies a i and a i such that neither strategy strictly dominates the other, there exists a constant w i > 0 such that the ratio of payoff differences from switching between a i and a i is always w i . In general, this is a weaker requirement than VNM-equivalence. It is weaker both because the proportional payoff differences property is no longer required to hold between some strategy pairs, and because the weight w i is not necessarily independent of the strategy pair. But if the game does not have dominated strategies, the weights can no longer depend on the strategies being compared, and better-response equivalence collapses to VNM-equivalence.
Two games are best-response equivalent if and only if, for each player i and each pair of strategies a i and a i such that both strategies are a best response to some belief, there exists a constant w i > 0 such that the ratio of payoff differences from switching between a i and a i is always w i . Even if a game has no dominated strategies, this is a weaker requirement than VNM-equivalence. In games with diminishing marginal returns, best-response equivalence is always a strictly weaker requirement than VNM-equivalence. Examples are given in the paper.
The most extensive discussion and applications of these relations have come in the literature on potential games. Monderer and Shapley (1996b) said that a game was a "potential game" if there exists a potential function, defined on the strategy space, with the property that the change in any player's payoff function from switching between any two of his strategies (holding other players' strategies fixed) was equal to the change in the potential function. 1 A game is "weighted potential game," if the payoff changes are proportional for each player. Thus a game is a weighted potential game if and only if it is VNM-equivalent to a game with identical payoff functions. While some results using potential or weighted potential game arguments are using the VNM-equivalence to identical interest games, other arguments are just using the better-response equivalence and even only best-response equivalence implications of VNM-equivalence. 2 Any paper that deals only with equilibria is using only best-response equivalence (e.g., Neyman, 1997; Ui, 2001; Morris and Ui, 2002) . Similarly, fictitious play only uses the best-response properties of the game (Monderer and Shapley, 1996a) . 3 An application using only better-response equivalence but not the VNM-equivalence appears in Morris (1999) . Some papers studying quantal responses or stochastic best responses in potential games use the full power of VNM-equivalence (e.g., Blume, 1993; Brock and Durlauf, 2001; Anderson et al., 2001; Ui, 2002) . 4 The fact that VNM-equivalence is the same as better-response equivalence in the absence of dominated strategies and may be different in the presence of dominated strategies has been noted in a number of contexts (see Sela, 1992; Blume, 1993, p. 409; Monderer and Shapley, 1996b, footnote 9; Maskin and Tirole, 2001, p. 209) . However, our characterizations of better-response equivalence in the presence of dominated strategies and of the significant gap between better-response equivalence and best-response equivalence fill a gap in the literature. 5 The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we describe our notions of equivalence and give an example illustrating the differences. In Section 3, we report our characterizations. In Section 4, we restrict attention to a class of games where best-response equivalence is a strictly weaker requirement than VNM-equivalence and characterize that class. We also discuss an extension to games with infinite strategy spaces and its application. Section 5 briefly discusses better-response and best-response equivalence in the mixed strategy extension of a game.
Equivalence properties of games
A game consists of a finite set of players N and a finite strategy set A i for i ∈ N , and a payoff function g i : A → R for i ∈ N where A = i∈N A i . We write A −i = j =i A j and a −i = (a j ) j =i ∈ A −i . We simply denote a game by g = (g i ) i∈N . Throughout the paper, we regard g i (a i , ·) :
be a set of player i's beliefs such that player i with a payoff function g i and a belief λ i ∈ Λ i (a i , X i | g i ) weakly prefers a i to any strategy in X i :
When X i is a singleton, i.e.,
3 Sela (1999) establishes convergence of fictitious play in a class of "one-against-all" games. These games are best-response equivalent to identical interest games, but not potential games. 4 More precisely, they use the full power of VNM-equivalence such that the constant w i is the same for all the players. 5 Mertens (1987) studied various notions of best-response equivalence, but with his more abstract strategy spaces and focus on admissible best responses, there is little overlap with the material in this paper.
We are interested in characterizing two equivalence relations on games captured by these sets of beliefs by which players prefer one particular strategy.
If g is better-response equivalent to g , then g is best-response equivalent to g , since
An easy sufficient condition for better-response equivalence is the following. 6 Definition 3. A game g is VNM-equivalent to g = (g i ) i∈N if, for each i ∈ N , there exists a positive constant w i > 0 and a function Q i :
It is straightforward to see that if g is VNM-equivalent to g , then
is well defined, and thus g is VNM-equivalent to g . Thus, we have the following lemma.
Lemma 1. A game g is VNM-equivalent to g if and only if, for each
for all a i , a i ∈ A i .
It is straightforward to see that VNM-equivalence is sufficient for better-response equivalence. In fact, (1) implies that
Best-response, better-response, and VNM-equivalence are equivalence relations. Thus, they define an equivalence class of games. For example, weighted potential games (Monderer and Shapley, 1996b ) with a weighted potential function f : A → R are regarded as a VNM-equivalence class of an identical interest game f = (f i ) i∈N with f i = f for all i ∈ N . This is clear by Lemma 1 and the following original definition of weighted potential games.
Definition 4.
A game g = (g i ) i∈N is a weighted potential game if there exists a weighted potential function f : A → R and w i > 0 for each i ∈ N such that
for all a i , a i ∈ A i . If w i = 1 for all i ∈ N , g is called a potential game and f is called a potential function.
As the concept of VNM-equivalence leads us to the definition of weighted potential games, the concept of better-response equivalence and that of best-response equivalence lead us to the following definitions of new classes of games.
Definition 5. A game g = (g i ) i∈N is a better-response potential game if it is betterresponse equivalent to an identical interest game f = (f i ) i∈N with f i = f for all i ∈ N . A function f is called a better-response potential function. Definition 6. A game g = (g i ) i∈N is a best-response potential game if it is best-response equivalent to an identical interest game f = (f i ) i∈N with f i = f for all i ∈ N . A function f is called a best-response potential function. Voorneveld (2000) called a game a best-response potential game if its best-response correspondence coincides with that of an identical interest game over the class of beliefs such that λ i (a −i ) = 0 or 1. Thus, best-response potential games in this paper form a special class of those in Voorneveld (2000) .
Existing potential game results that rely only on better-response equivalence or bestresponse equivalence, such as those mentioned in the introduction, automatically hold for the larger class of better-response potential games or that of best-response potential games. Thus, we are interested in exactly when and to what extent better-response and best-response equivalence are weaker requirements than VNM-equivalence.
Notice that best-response and better-response equivalence are clearly weaker requirements than VNM-equivalence, because the latter imposes too many constraints on payoffs from dominated strategies. Moreover, best-response equivalence is significantly weaker than better-response equivalence, as shown by the following example.
Consider a two player, three strategy, symmetric payoff game g(x, y) parameterized by (x, y) ∈ R 2 ++ , where each player's payoffs are given by the following payoff matrix (where the player's own strategies are represented by rows and his opponent's strategies are represented by columns):
In the special case where x = y = 1, we have game g(1, 1) with the following payoff matrix:
If a row player has a belief λ i (k) = π k for k ∈ {1, 2, 3}, he prefers strategy 1 to strategy 2 if and only if
he prefers strategy 1 to strategy 3 if and only if
he prefers strategy 3 to strategy 2 if and only if
Thus the region of indifference between strategies 1 and 2, and between strategy 2 and 3, does not depend on x and y. Moreover, whenever strategy 1 (or 3) is preferred to strategy 2, it is also preferred to strategy 3 (or 1). Thus the best response regions for this game are as in Fig. 1 , for any (x, y) ∈ R 2 ++ . Thus g(x, y) is best-response equivalent to g(1, 1) for any (x, y) ∈ R 2 ++ . On the other hand, the region of indifference between strategies 1 and 3 does depend on x and y: in particular, g(x, y) is better-response equivalent to g(1, 1) if and only if x = y. We will discuss this example again in Section 4.
Results

Generic properties of games
We will appeal to some generic properties of games, i.e., properties that will hold for all but a Lebesgue measure zero set of payoffs (as long as each player has at least two actions).
G1. For all
i ∈ N , if g i (a i , ·) g i (a i , ·), then g i (a i , ·) g i (a i , ·) for distinct a i , a i ∈ A i . G2. For all i ∈ N , vectors g i (a i , ·) − g i (a i , ·) and g i (a i , ·) − g i (a i , ·) are linearly independent for distinct a i , a i , a i ∈ A i . G3. For all i ∈ N , if Λ i (a i , A i | g i ) ∩ Λ i (a i , A i | g i ) = ∅, then Λ i a i , A i \ a i | g i \Λ i a i , a i | g i = ∅ for distinct a i , a i ∈ A i .
Better-response equivalence
Strategy a i strictly dominates a i in game g (we write a i 
Proposition 1. If games g and g satisfy generic property G1, then g is better-response equivalent to g if and only if, for each i ∈ N , (a) they have the same dominance relations (
Farkas' Lemma 7 plays a central role in the proofs.
Lemma 2 (Farkas' Lemma). For vectors a 0 , a 1 , . . . , a m ∈ R n , the following two conditions are equivalent.
7 See a textbook of convex analysis such as the recent one by Hiriart-Urruty and Lemaréchal (2001), or the classic one by Rockafellar (1970) . 8 I.e., if n j =1 a ij y j 0 for each i = 1, . . . , m, then n j =1 a 0j y j 0.
Proof of Proposition 1. We first show that (a) and (b) are sufficient for the better-response equivalence of g and g . If
and thus
To prove necessity, suppose that g is better-response equivalent to g . Since
we have 
This implies that if (y a
where 
This proves (b). 2
If g has no dominated strategy, then (2) is true for every a i , a i ∈ A i . If w i (a i , a i ) is the same for every a i , a i ∈ A i , then better-response equivalence implies VNM-equivalence. However, Proposition 1 does not say anything about whether w i (a i , a i ) does depend upon a i , a i ∈ A i . Thus, we are interested in when better-response equivalence implies VNMequivalence. The following proposition provides a sufficient condition for the equivalence of better-response equivalence and VNM-equivalence.
Proposition 2. Suppose that games g and g satisfy generic properties G1 and G2, and that, for each i ∈ N and for any a i , a i ∈ A i , there exists a sequence {a
k i } m k=1 such that a 1 i = a i , a m i = a i , a k i ∼ g i a k+1 i for k = 1, . . . , m − 1, and a k i ∼ g i a k+2 i for k = 1, . . ., m − 2.
Then g is better-response equivalent to g if and only if g is VNM-equivalent to g .
Note that the above condition concerning ∼ g i is trivially satisfied if no strategy is dominated, i.e., ∼ g i is the complete relation. So, the proposition immediately has the following corollary.
Corollary 3. If g and g satisfy generic properties G1 and G2 and have no strictly dominated strategies, then g is better-response equivalent to g if and only if g is VNMequivalent to g .
It should be emphasized that the sufficient condition of Proposition 2 is sometimes satisfied even when there are strictly dominated strategies in the game. For example, consider the following two player game, where only the row player's payoffs are shown: 1 2 1 4 1 2 1 3 3 2 2 4 3 0 .
Consider strategies of the row player. We have 1 Fig. 2 , satisfying the condition of Proposition 2, while strategy 1 strictly dominates strategy 4.
To prove the proposition, we use the following lemma.
Lemma 3. Suppose that g and g satisfy generic property G2. For some
Proof. Without loss of generality, assume that we have
are linearly independent and thus it must be true that
We now report the proof of Proposition 2.
Proof of Proposition 2. We show that if g is better-response equivalent to g then g is VNM-equivalent to g . By G1 and Proposition 1, if
If |A i | = 2, this completes the proof by Lemma 1. Suppose that Proof. We first show that (a) and (b) are sufficient for the best-response equivalence of g and g . If
is not true and thus (a) implies that
, and we must have
Clearly, (3) is true when
and thus there exists
However, this implies that a i ≈ g i a i , which is a contradiction. Thus, (3) must be true. If
and thus
Therefore, by (a), (3), and (4), we have
This completes the proof of sufficiency.
To prove necessity, suppose that g is best-response equivalent to g . Since
we have : 
This is a contradiction. Thus, we must have x a i a i > 0. We have 
Then, the expectation of the left-hand side of (5) is positive because 
Consider (λ i + λ i )/2 ∈ ∆(A −i ). Then, the expectation of the left-hand side of (6) is positive because
This is a contradiction. Thus, γ The following proposition and corollary follow by exactly the same arguments in Proposition 2 and Corollary 3 in the previous subsection for better-response equivalence. 
Games with own-strategy unimodality
Best-response equivalence relation is an equivalence relation. It will be useful if, as a closed form, we can describe the best-response equivalence class of a game in which best-response equivalence is a strictly weaker requirement than VNM-equivalence.
Let A i be linearly ordered such that
Let D i (g i ) be a class of payoff functions of player i obtained by this transformation:
D i (g i ) = g i : A → R | g i = (q i , w i ) • g i , q i : A −i → R, w i : A i \{K i } → R ++ .
It is straightforward to see that g i ∈ D i (g i ) if and only if there exists
Thus, D i (g i ) defines an equivalence class of payoff functions of player i. We write
For example, consider a parametrized class of games {g(x, y)} (x,y)∈R 2 ++ discussed in Section 2. We have that {g(x, y)} (x,y)∈R 2 ++ ⊂ D (g(1, 1) ). To see this, we write g(x, y) = (g i (· | x, y)) i∈{1,2} . Then, for any (x, y) ∈ R 2 ++ and i = j ,
where q i : {1, 2, 3} → R is such that q i (1) = x, q i (2) = −x, and q i (3) = −2x. Remember that, for any (x, y) ∈ R 2 ++ , g(x, y) is best-response equivalent to g(1, 1). It is easy to see that every game in D (g(1, 1) ) is VNM-equivalent to g(x, y) for some (x, y) ∈ R 2 ++ . Thus, every game in D (g(1, 1) ) is best-response equivalent to g(1, 1).
This observation leads us to the question when every game in D(g) is best-response equivalent to g. We provide a necessary and sufficient condition for it.
We say that g i is own-strategy unimodal if, for all λ i ∈ ∆(A −i ), there exists k * ∈ A i such that,
Note that if g i is own-strategy unimodal, then (8) 
is true if and only if
Clearly, by (7), g i is own-strategy unimodal if and only if g i ∈ D i (g i ) is own-strategy unimodal. We say that g i is own-strategy concave if
and that there is no weakly dominated strategy. Then, g i is own-strategy unimodal if and only if there existsg i ∈ D i (g i ) such thatg i is own-strategy concave.
Proof. Suppose thatg
Suppose that g i is own-strategy unimodal. We prove the existence of an own-strategy concave payoff functiong i = (q i , w i ) • g i by construction. Later, we will show that there exists C k > 0 such that
For C k satisfying (9), we let w i : A i → R ++ be such that w i (1) = 1 and w i (a i ) = a i −1 k=1 C k for a i 2, and q i :
we havẽ
By this and (9), we havẽ
which implies thatg i is own-strategy concave.
We prove the existence of C k satisfying (9) by Farkas' Lemma. Before doing it, we must first observe that if
To see this, suppose otherwise. Then, there exists λ i ∈ ∆(A −i ) satisfying both (10) and
Since
Let ε > 0 be sufficiently small. More precisely, let ε > 0 be such that
Then, we have
which contradicts to the assumption that g i is own-strategy unimodal. Now, we know that, if g i is own-strategy unimodal and satisfies the assumptions, then it must be true that if
This implies that if (y a
By Farkas' Lemma, there exist x k 0 and z a −i 0 for a −i ∈ A −i such that
Thus,
If
However, this is impossible since there is no weakly dominated strategy. Thus,
is not always own-strategy concave. However, g i (· | 1, 1) is own-strategy concave. Thus, Lemma 4 says that g i (· | x, y) is own-strategy unimodal.
We claim that, generically, D(g) is a best-response equivalence class if and only if g i is own-strategy unimodal for all i ∈ N .
Proposition 7. Suppose that g has no dominated strategy. Every game in D(g) is bestresponse equivalent to g if and only if g i is own-strategy unimodal for all i ∈ N . If g i is own-strategy unimodal for all i ∈ N and g satisfies generic property G3, then every game best-response equivalent to g and satisfying G3 is in D(g).
Proof. Suppose that g i is own-strategy unimodal for all i ∈ N . We show that if g ∈ D(g) then g is best-response equivalent to g.
By (7), this is true if and only if
Since g i is own-strategy unimodal, we have (13), which is true if and only if (12) is true. Thus,
and thus g is best-response equivalent to g. Conversely, suppose that every game in D(g) is best-response equivalent to g. We show that g i is own-strategy unimodal for all i ∈ N . Seeking a contradiction, suppose otherwise. 
a * i >ã i and
When (14) is true, let
By choosing very large L > 0, we have
When (15) is true, we also have
by the similar argument. This implies that some game in D(g) is not best-response equivalent to g, which completes the proof of the first half of the proposition.
We prove the last half of the proposition. Suppose that g i is own-strategy unimodal for all i ∈ N and that g satisfies generic property G3. Let g be best-response equivalent to g and satisfy G3. We show g ∈ D(g).
We first observe that
, which exists since g has no dominated strategy. Note that if
for all a i k,
Let t ∈ [0, 1] and λ
Then, (16) implies that
By (17), we have λ
Since g and g satisfy G3 and are best-response equivalent, we can use Proposition 4, which says that there exists w i :
This implies that g i ∈ D i (g i ) and thus g ∈ D(g). 2
A weaker, but similar claim is true for games such that strategy sets are intervals of real numbers and payoff functions are differentiable, which has a couple of applications. In the remainder of this section, we discuss this issue.
Abusing notation, we give a definition of best-response equivalence for a class of games with a continuum of actions. Let A i be a closed interval of R for all i ∈ N . Assume that g i : A → R is bounded and continuously differentiable. Let ∆(A −i ) be the set of all probability measures over A −i and Λ i (a i , X i | g i ) be such that
The definition of best-response equivalence is the same as that for finite games: we say that g is best-response equivalent to g if, for
We say that g i is own-strategy unimodal if, for any λ i ∈ ∆(A −i ), there exists x * such that ∂ ∂a i
Note that if g i is own-strategy unimodal, then (18) is true if and only 
Proposition 8. Suppose that g i is own-strategy unimodal for all i ∈ N . Then, every game in D(g) is best-response equivalent to g.
is true if and only if
Thus, g i is also own-strategy unimodal. Since (19) 
This proposition has a useful application concerning the uniqueness of correlated equilibria. Neyman (1997) showed that if g has a continuously differentiable and strictly concave potential function, 9 then the potential maximizer is the unique correlated equilibrium of g. The set of correlated equilibria is the same for two games if the two games are best-response equivalent. Thus, we claim the following.
Corollary 9.
Suppose that g has a continuously differentiable and strictly concave potential function f . Then, the potential maximizer is the unique correlated equilibrium of every game in D(g).
Note that a game in D(g) is not necessarily a potential game and payoff functions are not necessarily concave.
Mixed extensions of equivalence
We have focused on players' preferences over pure strategies, given nondegenerate conjectures about their opponents' behavior. But we could ask the same question in the mixed strategy extension of the original game; equivalently, we could look at players' preferences over mixed strategies. 10 The natural question is whether or not our discussion so far must be modified by the "mixed extension" of equivalence.
For i ∈ N , let ∆(A i ) denote the set of all mixed strategies of player i. Abusing notation, we write 9 The definition of potential functions of this class of games is the same as those of finite games. 10 The associate editor suggested the observations in this section. Note that VNM-equivalence is sufficient for both mixed better-response equivalence and mixed best-response equivalence. Note also that mixed better-response equivalence is sufficient for better-response equivalence, and that mixed best-response equivalence is sufficient for best-response equivalence. It is easy to see that mixed best-response equivalence is not only sufficient but also necessary for best-response equivalence. This lemma implies that the characterization of mixed best-response equivalence is reduced to that of best-response equivalence.
On the other hand, mixed better-response equivalence is a strictly stronger requirement than better-response equivalence. Consider a two player, three strategy, symmetric payoff games g and g , where each player's payoffs are given by the following payoff matrices 
By the weighted average of (21) and (22) 
